LatentTriad: Pre-Action Risk Representations for Malicious Agent Skill Detection
원문 초록
Large language model agents are increasingly extended with reusable skills, but untrusted skill content can induce operations outside the user's task. Detecting this contextual risk requires more than suspicious-pattern matching, while dynamic analysis incurs the cost of skill execution. We find that hidden states formed during prefill contain readable information about task-operation consistency, including across held-out expression forms in controlled evaluations. Matched Operation-state interventions also affect later Boundary states and shift fixed risk readouts toward the donor label. Based on these findings, we introduce LatentTriad, which combines contextual Boundary features, group-adjusted Operation directions, and departures from benign state relationships. All branches share one prefill: detection generates no output tokens, invokes no tools, and executes no skill code. Across 5,830 skill packages from five sources and seven backbones, LatentTriad achieves 99.0-99.2% pooled F1 and 93.0-94.6% source-macro F1. A separately measured compact implementation completes prefill and detection in a median of 259-284 ms. These results connect pre-action risk readability and functional influence to execution-free skill screening.
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- arXiv:2611.05088v1제출 시각 미확인
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