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arXiv:2407.00918공식 코드 · Papers with Code

Robust and Reliable Early-Stage Website Fingerprinting Attacks via Spatial-Temporal Distribution Analysis

Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks identify the websites visited by users by performing traffic analysis, compromising user privacy. Particularly, DL-based WF attacks demonstrate impressive attack performance. However, the effectiveness of DL-based WF attacks relies on the collected complete and pure traffic during the page loading, which impacts the practicality of these attacks. The WF performance is rather low under dynamic network conditions and various WF defenses, particularly when the analyzed traffic is only a small part of the complete traffic. In this paper, we propose Holmes, a robust and reliable early-stage WF attack. Holmes utilizes temporal and spatial distribution analysis of website traffic to effectively identify websites in the early stages of page loading. Specifically, Holmes develops adaptive data augmentation based on the temporal distribution of website traffic and utilizes a supervised contrastive learning method to extract the correlations between the early-stage traffic and the pre-collected complete traffic. Holmes accurately identifies traffic in the early stages of page loading by computing the correlation of the traffic with the spatial distribution information, which ensures robust and reliable detection according to early-stage traffic. We extensively evaluate Holmes using six datasets. Compared to nine existing DL-based WF attacks, Holmes improves the F1-score of identifying early-stage traffic by an average of 169.18%. Furthermore, we replay the traffic of visiting real-world dark web websites. Holmes successfully identifies dark web websites when the ratio of page loading on average is only 21.71%, with an average precision improvement of 169.36% over the existing WF attacks.

arXiv:2302.13763

Efficient and Low Overhead Website Fingerprinting Attacks and Defenses based on TCP/IP Traffic

Website fingerprinting attack is an extensively studied technique used in a web browser to analyze traffic patterns and thus infer confidential information about users. Several website fingerprinting attacks based on machine learning and deep learning tend to use the most typical features to achieve a satisfactory performance of attacking rate. However, these attacks suffer from several practical implementation factors, such as a skillfully pre-processing step or a clean dataset. To defend against such attacks, random packet defense (RPD) with a high cost of excessive network overhead is usually applied. In this work, we first propose a practical filter-assisted attack against RPD, which can filter out the injected noises using the statistical characteristics of TCP/IP traffic. Then, we propose a list-assisted defensive mechanism to defend the proposed attack method. To achieve a configurable trade-off between the defense and the network overhead, we further improve the list-based defense by a traffic splitting mechanism, which can combat the mentioned attacks as well as save a considerable amount of network overhead. In the experiments, we collect real-life traffic patterns using three mainstream browsers, i.e., Microsoft Edge, Google Chrome, and Mozilla Firefox, and extensive results conducted on the closed and open-world datasets show the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms in terms of defense accuracy and network efficiency.

arXiv:1811.07153

Robust Website Fingerprinting Through the Cache Occupancy Channel

Website fingerprinting attacks, which use statistical analysis on network traffic to compromise user privacy, have been shown to be effective even if the traffic is sent over anonymity-preserving networks such as Tor. The classical attack model used to evaluate website fingerprinting attacks assumes an on-path adversary, who can observe all traffic traveling between the user's computer and the Tor network. In this work we investigate these attacks under a different attack model, in which the adversary is capable of running a small amount of unprivileged code on the target user's computer. Under this model, the attacker can mount cache side-channel attacks, which exploit the effects of contention on the CPU's cache, to identify the website being browsed. In an important special case of this attack model, a JavaScript attack is launched when the target user visits a website controlled by the attacker. The effectiveness of this attack scenario has never been systematically analyzed, especially in the open-world model which assumes that the user is visiting a mix of both sensitive and non-sensitive sites. In this work we show that cache website fingerprinting attacks in JavaScript are highly feasible, even when they are run from highly restrictive environments, such as the Tor Browser. Specifically, we use machine learning techniques to classify traces of cache activity. Unlike prior works, which try to identify cache conflicts, our work measures the overall occupancy of the last-level cache. We show that our approach achieves high classification accuracy in both the open-world and the closed-world models. We further show that our techniques are resilient both to network-based defenses and to side-channel countermeasures introduced to modern browsers as a response to the Spectre attack.

arXiv:1711.03656

p-FP: Extraction, Classification, and Prediction of Website Fingerprints with Deep Learning

Recent advances in learning Deep Neural Network (DNN) architectures have received a great deal of attention due to their ability to outperform state-of-the-art classifiers across a wide range of applications, with little or no feature engineering. In this paper, we broadly study the applicability of deep learning to website fingerprinting. We show that unsupervised DNNs can be used to extract low-dimensional feature vectors that improve the performance of state-of-the-art website fingerprinting attacks. When used as classifiers, we show that they can match or exceed performance of existing attacks across a range of application scenarios, including fingerprinting Tor website traces, fingerprinting search engine queries over Tor, defeating fingerprinting defenses, and fingerprinting TLS-encrypted websites. Finally, we show that DNNs can be used to predict the fingerprintability of a website based on its contents, achieving 99% accuracy on a data set of 4500 website downloads.