원문 초록
An image can pass automated safety checks while showing harmful content to its human viewer. We introduce DRJanus, a visual camouflage attack that exploits the gap between standard dynamic range (SDR) processing and high dynamic range (HDR) display. Automated systems often read only an image's SDR base, whereas HDR viewers reconstruct its appearance using an auxiliary gain map. DRJanus inverts this reconstruction to embed two independently chosen color images in a single JPEG, without querying or optimizing against the target model. It preserves the chosen SDR base exactly and reconstructs HDR targets at an average PSNR of 43.03 dB across 400 images. On a benchmark of 100 sexual-content images, DRJanus evades detection by all six tested commercial moderation services and nine vision-language models. Across five agents, each evaluated on 120 task cases per threat setting, attack success ranges from 31.67% to 100% for moderation evasion and from 95% to 100% for task manipulation. We also explore cross-view consistency checks as a mitigation. These findings expose a gap in visual trust: securing what a machine reads does not secure what a user sees. A demo is available at https://qshen0629.github.io/DRJanus/
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- arXiv:2611.25469v1제출 시각 미확인
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