arXiv:2611.24765v1 cs.CR

LLM-Guided Cyber-Physical Attack Path Identification in Smart Grids

Amr Elshazly, Jesse Roberts, Rachad Atat, Muhammad Ismail

제출 2026-11-19

원문 초록

Identifying high-impact attack paths in cyber-physical power systems is critical for improving grid resilience. Existing methods typically rely on either structural topology analysis or simulation-based cascading-failure models. Topology-based approaches capture connectivity but lack adversarial reasoning, while simulation-driven methods are primarily suited for offline analysis and are less effective for rapid evaluation of evolving attack scenarios. As a result, identifying realistic attack paths that jointly capture topology, threat semantics, and physical impact remains challenging. This paper presents a physics-grounded framework for identifying cyber-physical attack paths using large language models (LLMs), with cascading-failure-derived impact rankings used as physics-grounded references. The framework integrates system topology, LLM-guided STRIDE and MITRE ATT&CK threat modeling, and three baseline strategies for comparison: topology-driven, threat-driven, and fusion-based. Evaluation is performed using (i) critical-node overlap between LLM-inferred top-K rankings and cascading-failure-based ground truth; (ii) node-level similarity between LLM-inferred and reference paths; and (iii) path-level alignment capturing agreement in complete attack sequences. Results show that structured LLM-based threat modeling substantially improves alignment with physics-grounded references. In the cyber layer, critical-node overlap@3 increases from approximately 33% to as high as 100%, while node-level similarity reaches up to 65% and path-level alignment reaches up to 48%. In addition, the proposed framework reduces runtime by approximately 75--85% compared to the fusion-based baseline in the IEEE 14-bus system. These results suggest that LLM-guided attack path identification is a promising approach for efficient and impact-aware cyber-physical security analysis.

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  1. arXiv:2611.24765v1제출 시각 미확인

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