Reading Scene States: Uncovering Safety Failures in Vision-Language Models
원문 초록
Vision-language models (VLMs) can provide harmful assistance by interpreting visual events, even without an explicit request for the underlying harmful objective. We identify this \textbf{scene-state safety vulnerability} and introduce \textbf{SceneSafetyBench}, comprising 375 image--question pairs spanning Initial, Medium, and Ultimate scene states and five visual presentations. Across eight VLMs, scene-state inputs elicit harmful assistance with attack success rates (ASRs) of 45.6--72.3\%. Comparative analysis across three VLMs shows that scene-state inputs most closely resemble QR-related images in their layer-wise safety-related signal profiles, while exhibiting lower average late-layer readouts and distinct signal dynamics during generation. To turn this vulnerability into a systematic attack, we propose \textbf{S3TA}, which translates harmful objectives into scene states, queries image--question pairs independently, and assembles the responses. On seven MM-SafetyBench categories across eight open-weight and commercial VLMs, S3TA achieves a model-average ASR of \textbf{71.2\%, exceeding the strongest baseline by 6.1 percentage points}. Text-side filters and visual moderation provide limited protection. These findings highlight the need to safeguard the assistance models infer through scene-grounded reasoning, beyond screening input content.
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- arXiv:2611.23206v1제출 시각 미확인
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