원문 초록
Restricting what a model can say is often mistaken for restricting an attacker's influence over its decision. An attacker can add text to the evidence and steer the model toward a wrong answer that still belongs to the allowed set. We evaluate seven decision models spanning hosted APIs, open-weight models and an encoder on 16 tasks in seven domains from Decision Bench, targeting every wrong option across 240 text examples (990 targets per model). We present Slot Attack, a black-box attack designed for decision models that appends text assembled from named components to steer predictions toward an attacker-selected incorrect option. The method relies solely on returned label probabilities, achieves success rates of 32--99\% on initially correct decisions, and identifies the effective component combinations with a median of 17--72 queries per successful attack. Accuracy and confidence do not reliably reveal this vulnerability. Models with near-identical accuracy on the sampled tasks differ by about 20\%age points in attack success. We demonstrate that an attacker can force not just one wrong answer but every available one: on about 20\% of correct decisions for the JEV models, 77\% for gpt-6-luna and 98\% for GLiNER2.5; a confidence threshold does not reliably screen the attack out. A fixed answer set constrains a decision's form, not its source; robustness must be measured per model, per task and per version rather than assumed from output format.
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- arXiv:2611.03759v1제출 시각 미확인
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