arXiv:2506.01333

ETDI: Mitigating Tool Squatting and Rug Pull Attacks in Model Context Protocol (MCP) by using OAuth-Enhanced Tool Definitions and Policy-Based Access Control

Manish Bhatt, Vineeth Sai Narajala, Idan Habler

제출 2025-06-02

원문 초록

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) plays a crucial role in extending the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) by enabling integration with external tools and data sources. However, the standard MCP specification presents significant security vulnerabilities, notably Tool Poisoning and Rug Pull attacks. This paper introduces the Enhanced Tool Definition Interface (ETDI), a security extension designed to fortify MCP. ETDI incorporates cryptographic identity verification, immutable versioned tool definitions, and explicit permission management, often leveraging OAuth 2.0. We further propose extending MCP with fine-grained, policy-based access control, where tool capabilities are dynamically evaluated against explicit policies using a dedicated policy engine, considering runtime context beyond static OAuth scopes. This layered approach aims to establish a more secure, trustworthy, and controllable ecosystem for AI applications interacting with LLMs and external tools.

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