JULI: Jailbreak Large Language Models by Self-Introspection
원문 초록
Large Language Models (LLMs) are trained with safety alignment to prevent generating malicious content. Although some attacks have highlighted vulnerabilities in these safety-aligned LLMs, they typically have limitations, such as necessitating access to the model weights or the generation process. Since proprietary models through API-calling do not grant users such permissions, these attacks find it challenging to compromise them. In this paper, we propose Jailbreaking Using LLM Introspection (JULI), which jailbreaks LLMs by manipulating the token log probabilities, using a tiny plug-in block, BiasNet. JULI relies solely on the knowledge of the target LLM's predicted token log probabilities. It can effectively jailbreak API-calling LLMs under a black-box setting and knowing only top-$5$ token log probabilities. Our approach demonstrates superior effectiveness, outperforming existing state-of-the-art (SOTA) approaches across multiple metrics.
함께 살펴볼 논문
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The Devil behind the mask: An emergent safety vulnerability of Diffusion LLMs
Safe Pruning LoRA: Robust Distance-Guided Pruning for Safety Alignment in Adaptation of LLMs
Probing the Robustness of Large Language Models Safety to Latent Perturbations
Probe before You Talk: Towards Black-box Defense against Backdoor Unalignment for Large Language Models
Mitigating Safety Fallback in Editing-based Backdoor Injection on LLMs
Monitoring Decomposition Attacks in LLMs with Lightweight Sequential Monitors
토론
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