Pricing Valid Cuts for Price-Match Equilibria
원문 초록
We use valid inequalities (cuts) of the binary integer program for winner determination in a combinatorial auction (CA) as "artificial items" that can be interpreted intuitively and priced to generate Artificial Walrasian Equilibria. While the lack of an integer programming gap is sufficient to guarantee a Walrasian equilibrium, we show that it does not guarantee a "price-match equilibrium" (PME), a refinement that we introduce, in which prices are justified by an iso-revenue outcome for any hypothetical removal of a single bidder. We prove the existence of PME for any CA and characterize their economic properties and computation. We implement minimally artificial PME rules and compare them with other prominent CA payment rules in the literature.
함께 살펴볼 논문
공통 태그를 근거로 연결했습니다. 실제 인용 관계나 논문의 우수성을 뜻하지 않습니다.
The kernel of graph indices for vector search
Model-Based Real-Time Pose and Sag Estimation of Overhead Power Lines Using LiDAR for Drone Inspection
PocketVina Enables Scalable and Highly Accurate Physically Valid Docking through Multi-Pocket Conditioning
SWE-Factory: Your Automated Factory for Issue Resolution Training Data and Evaluation Benchmarks
Step-by-step Instructions and a Simple Tabular Output Format Improve the Dependency Parsing Accuracy of LLMs
Employing self-supervised learning models for cross-linguistic child speech maturity classification
토론
이 논문과 연결된 포럼 글이 아직 없습니다.