arXiv:2502.00970
The Market Design for Formulary Positions
원문 초록
The exchange of rebates for formulary positions is conceptualized as a multi-round combinatorial position auction. This paper develops a linear assignment model of the winners' determination equation of this auction where the bases are net unit prices after unit rebates and expected demand.
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