No Algorithmic Collusion in Two-Player Blindfolded Game with Thompson Sampling
원문 초록
When two players are engaged in a repeated game with unknown payoff matrices, they may be completely unaware of the existence of each other and use multi-armed bandit algorithms to choose the actions, which is referred to as the ``blindfolded game'' in this paper. We show that when the players use Thompson sampling, the game dynamics converges to the Nash equilibrium under a mild assumption on the payoff matrices. Therefore, algorithmic collusion doesn't arise in this case despite the fact that the players do not intentionally deploy competitive strategies. To prove the convergence result, we find that the framework developed in stochastic approximation doesn't apply, because of the sporadic and infrequent updates of the inferior actions and the lack of Lipschitz continuity. We develop a novel sample-path-wise approach to show the convergence.
함께 살펴볼 논문
공통 태그를 근거로 연결했습니다. 실제 인용 관계나 논문의 우수성을 뜻하지 않습니다.
Representative Action Selection for Large Action-Space Meta-Bandits
Steering Generative Models with Experimental Data for Protein Fitness Optimization
Addressing Missing Data Issue for Diffusion-based Recommendation
Dynamic Assortment Selection and Pricing with Censored Preference Feedback
Bandit-Based Prompt Design Strategy Selection Improves Prompt Optimizers
Langevin Soft Actor-Critic: Efficient Exploration through Uncertainty-Driven Critic Learning
토론
이 논문과 연결된 포럼 글이 아직 없습니다.