Detecting Anomalous Microflows in IoT Volumetric Attacks via Dynamic Monitoring of MUD Activity

원문 초록

IoT networks are increasingly becoming target of sophisticated new cyber-attacks. Anomaly-based detection methods are promising in finding new attacks, but there are certain practical challenges like false-positive alarms, hard to explain, and difficult to scale cost-effectively. The IETF recent standard called Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) seems promising to limit the attack surface on IoT devices by formally specifying their intended network behavior. In this paper, we use SDN to enforce and monitor the expected behaviors of each IoT device, and train one-class classifier models to detect volumetric attacks. Our specific contributions are fourfold. (1) We develop a multi-level inferencing model to dynamically detect anomalous patterns in network activity of MUD-compliant traffic flows via SDN telemetry, followed by packet inspection of anomalous flows. This provides enhanced fine-grained visibility into distributed and direct attacks, allowing us to precisely isolate volumetric attacks with microflow (5-tuple) resolution. (2) We collect traffic traces (benign and a variety of volumetric attacks) from network behavior of IoT devices in our lab, generate labeled datasets, and make them available to the public. (3) We prototype a full working system (modules are released as open-source), demonstrates its efficacy in detecting volumetric attacks on several consumer IoT devices with high accuracy while maintaining low false positives, and provides insights into cost and performance of our system. (4) We demonstrate how our models scale in environments with a large number of connected IoTs (with datasets collected from a network of IP cameras in our university campus) by considering various training strategies (per device unit versus per device type), and balancing the accuracy of prediction against the cost of models in terms of size and training time.