Sample-Efficient Reinforcement Learning of Partially Observable Markov Games
원문 초록
This paper considers the challenging tasks of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) under partial observability, where each agent only sees her own individual observations and actions that reveal incomplete information about the underlying state of system. This paper studies these tasks under the general model of multiplayer general-sum Partially Observable Markov Games (POMGs), which is significantly larger than the standard model of Imperfect Information Extensive-Form Games (IIEFGs). We identify a rich subclass of POMGs -- weakly revealing POMGs -- in which sample-efficient learning is tractable. In the self-play setting, we prove that a simple algorithm combining optimism and Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) is sufficient to find approximate Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, as well as coarse correlated equilibria of weakly revealing POMGs, in a polynomial number of samples when the number of agents is small. In the setting of playing against adversarial opponents, we show that a variant of our optimistic MLE algorithm is capable of achieving sublinear regret when being compared against the optimal maximin policies. To our best knowledge, this work provides the first line of sample-efficient results for learning POMGs.
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