Textual Backdoor Attacks Can Be More Harmful via Two Simple Tricks
원문 초록
Backdoor attacks are a kind of emergent security threat in deep learning. After being injected with a backdoor, a deep neural model will behave normally on standard inputs but give adversary-specified predictions once the input contains specific backdoor triggers. In this paper, we find two simple tricks that can make existing textual backdoor attacks much more harmful. The first trick is to add an extra training task to distinguish poisoned and clean data during the training of the victim model, and the second one is to use all the clean training data rather than remove the original clean data corresponding to the poisoned data. These two tricks are universally applicable to different attack models. We conduct experiments in three tough situations including clean data fine-tuning, low-poisoning-rate, and label-consistent attacks. Experimental results show that the two tricks can significantly improve attack performance. This paper exhibits the great potential harmfulness of backdoor attacks. All the code and data can be obtained at \url{https://github.com/thunlp/StyleAttack}.
함께 살펴볼 논문
공통 태그를 근거로 연결했습니다. 실제 인용 관계나 논문의 우수성을 뜻하지 않습니다.
Quantile-Based Deep Reinforcement Learning using Two-Timescale Policy Gradient Algorithms
Leveraging the two timescale regime to demonstrate convergence of neural networks
Training a Two Layer ReLU Network Analytically
MiniRBT: A Two-stage Distilled Small Chinese Pre-trained Model
FinalMLP: An Enhanced Two-Stream MLP Model for CTR Prediction
Using Simple Incentives to Improve Two-Sided Fairness in Ridesharing Systems
토론
이 논문과 연결된 포럼 글이 아직 없습니다.