On the Complexity of Computing Markov Perfect Equilibrium in General-Sum Stochastic Games
원문 초록
Similar to the role of Markov decision processes in reinforcement learning, Stochastic Games (SGs) lay the foundation for the study of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) and sequential agent interactions. In this paper, we derive that computing an approximate Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) in a finite-state discounted Stochastic Game within the exponential precision is \textbf{PPAD}-complete. We adopt a function with a polynomially bounded description in the strategy space to convert the MPE computation to a fixed-point problem, even though the stochastic game may demand an exponential number of pure strategies, in the number of states, for each agent. The completeness result follows the reduction of the fixed-point problem to {\sc End of the Line}. Our results indicate that finding an MPE in SGs is highly unlikely to be \textbf{NP}-hard unless \textbf{NP}=\textbf{co-NP}. Our work offers confidence for MARL research to study MPE computation on general-sum SGs and to develop fruitful algorithms as currently on zero-sum SGs.
함께 살펴볼 논문
공통 태그를 근거로 연결했습니다. 실제 인용 관계나 논문의 우수성을 뜻하지 않습니다.
Robust Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning with Model Uncertainty
Multi-Step Reinforcement Learning for Single Image Super-Resolution
Multirobot Coverage of Modular Environments
Margin Trader: A Reinforcement Learning Framework for Portfolio Management with Margin and Constraints
Using Fuzzy Logic to Learn Abstract Policies in Large-Scale Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
Task Independent Capsule-Based Agents for Deep Q-Learning
토론
이 논문과 연결된 포럼 글이 아직 없습니다.