Learning Strategy-Aware Linear Classifiers
원문 초록
We address the question of repeatedly learning linear classifiers against agents who are strategically trying to game the deployed classifiers, and we use the Stackelberg regret to measure the performance of our algorithms. First, we show that Stackelberg and external regret for the problem of strategic classification are strongly incompatible: i.e., there exist worst-case scenarios, where any sequence of actions providing sublinear external regret might result in linear Stackelberg regret and vice versa. Second, we present a strategy-aware algorithm for minimizing the Stackelberg regret for which we prove nearly matching upper and lower regret bounds. Finally, we provide simulations to complement our theoretical analysis. Our results advance the growing literature of learning from revealed preferences, which has so far focused on "smoother" assumptions from the perspective of the learner and the agents respectively.
함께 살펴볼 논문
공통 태그를 근거로 연결했습니다. 실제 인용 관계나 논문의 우수성을 뜻하지 않습니다.
Using Instruction-Tuned Large Language Models to Identify Indicators of Vulnerability in Police Incident Narratives
Harmonic-NAS: Hardware-Aware Multimodal Neural Architecture Search on Resource-constrained Devices
STRAPPER: Preference-based Reinforcement Learning via Self-training Augmentation and Peer Regularization
Unlocking the Use of Raw Multispectral Earth Observation Imagery for Onboard Artificial Intelligence
VNE: An Effective Method for Improving Deep Representation by Manipulating Eigenvalue Distribution
Continuous Indeterminate Probability Neural Network
토론
이 논문과 연결된 포럼 글이 아직 없습니다.