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arXiv:2007.02220

You Autocomplete Me: Poisoning Vulnerabilities in Neural Code Completion

Code autocompletion is an integral feature of modern code editors and IDEs. The latest generation of autocompleters uses neural language models, trained on public open-source code repositories, to suggest likely (not just statically feasible) completions given the current context. We demonstrate that neural code autocompleters are vulnerable to poisoning attacks. By adding a few specially-crafted files to the autocompleter's training corpus (data poisoning), or else by directly fine-tuning the autocompleter on these files (model poisoning), the attacker can influence its suggestions for attacker-chosen contexts. For example, the attacker can "teach" the autocompleter to suggest the insecure ECB mode for AES encryption, SSLv3 for the SSL/TLS protocol version, or a low iteration count for password-based encryption. Moreover, we show that these attacks can be targeted: an autocompleter poisoned by a targeted attack is much more likely to suggest the insecure completion for files from a specific repo or specific developer. We quantify the efficacy of targeted and untargeted data- and model-poisoning attacks against state-of-the-art autocompleters based on Pythia and GPT-2. We then evaluate existing defenses against poisoning attacks and show that they are largely ineffective.

arXiv:2006.12583

Exact Support Recovery in Federated Regression with One-shot Communication

Federated learning provides a framework to address the challenges of distributed computing, data ownership and privacy over a large number of distributed clients with low computational and communication capabilities. In this paper, we study the problem of learning the exact support of sparse linear regression in the federated learning setup. We provide a simple communication efficient algorithm which only needs one-shot communication with the centralized server to compute the exact support. Our method does not require the clients to solve any optimization problem and thus, can be run on devices with low computational capabilities. Our method is naturally robust to the problems of client failure, model poisoning and straggling clients. We formally prove that our method requires a number of samples per client that is polynomial with respect to the support size, but independent of the dimension of the problem. We require the number of distributed clients to be logarithmic in the dimension of the problem. If the predictor variables are mutually independent then the overall sample complexity matches the optimal sample complexity of the non-federated centralized setting. Furthermore, our method is easy to implement and has an overall polynomial time complexity.

arXiv:2002.00211

Learning to Detect Malicious Clients for Robust Federated Learning

Federated learning systems are vulnerable to attacks from malicious clients. As the central server in the system cannot govern the behaviors of the clients, a rogue client may initiate an attack by sending malicious model updates to the server, so as to degrade the learning performance or enforce targeted model poisoning attacks (a.k.a. backdoor attacks). Therefore, timely detecting these malicious model updates and the underlying attackers becomes critically important. In this work, we propose a new framework for robust federated learning where the central server learns to detect and remove the malicious model updates using a powerful detection model, leading to targeted defense. We evaluate our solution in both image classification and sentiment analysis tasks with a variety of machine learning models. Experimental results show that our solution ensures robust federated learning that is resilient to both the Byzantine attacks and the targeted model poisoning attacks.

arXiv:1911.11815

Local Model Poisoning Attacks to Byzantine-Robust Federated Learning

In federated learning, multiple client devices jointly learn a machine learning model: each client device maintains a local model for its local training dataset, while a master device maintains a global model via aggregating the local models from the client devices. The machine learning community recently proposed several federated learning methods that were claimed to be robust against Byzantine failures (e.g., system failures, adversarial manipulations) of certain client devices. In this work, we perform the first systematic study on local model poisoning attacks to federated learning. We assume an attacker has compromised some client devices, and the attacker manipulates the local model parameters on the compromised client devices during the learning process such that the global model has a large testing error rate. We formulate our attacks as optimization problems and apply our attacks to four recent Byzantine-robust federated learning methods. Our empirical results on four real-world datasets show that our attacks can substantially increase the error rates of the models learnt by the federated learning methods that were claimed to be robust against Byzantine failures of some client devices. We generalize two defenses for data poisoning attacks to defend against our local model poisoning attacks. Our evaluation results show that one defense can effectively defend against our attacks in some cases, but the defenses are not effective enough in other cases, highlighting the need for new defenses against our local model poisoning attacks to federated learning.

arXiv:1906.02872

Mixed Strategy Game Model Against Data Poisoning Attacks

In this paper we use game theory to model poisoning attack scenarios. We prove the non-existence of pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in the attacker and defender game. We then propose a mixed extension of our game model and an algorithm to approximate the Nash Equilibrium strategy for the defender. We then demonstrate the effectiveness of the mixed defence strategy generated by the algorithm, in an experiment.

arXiv:1811.12470공식 코드 · Papers with Code

Analyzing Federated Learning through an Adversarial Lens

Federated learning distributes model training among a multitude of agents, who, guided by privacy concerns, perform training using their local data but share only model parameter updates, for iterative aggregation at the server. In this work, we explore the threat of model poisoning attacks on federated learning initiated by a single, non-colluding malicious agent where the adversarial objective is to cause the model to misclassify a set of chosen inputs with high confidence. We explore a number of strategies to carry out this attack, starting with simple boosting of the malicious agent's update to overcome the effects of other agents' updates. To increase attack stealth, we propose an alternating minimization strategy, which alternately optimizes for the training loss and the adversarial objective. We follow up by using parameter estimation for the benign agents' updates to improve on attack success. Finally, we use a suite of interpretability techniques to generate visual explanations of model decisions for both benign and malicious models and show that the explanations are nearly visually indistinguishable. Our results indicate that even a highly constrained adversary can carry out model poisoning attacks while simultaneously maintaining stealth, thus highlighting the vulnerability of the federated learning setting and the need to develop effective defense strategies.

arXiv:1808.04866공식 코드 · Papers with Code

Mitigating Sybils in Federated Learning Poisoning

Machine learning (ML) over distributed multi-party data is required for a variety of domains. Existing approaches, such as federated learning, collect the outputs computed by a group of devices at a central aggregator and run iterative algorithms to train a globally shared model. Unfortunately, such approaches are susceptible to a variety of attacks, including model poisoning, which is made substantially worse in the presence of sybils. In this paper we first evaluate the vulnerability of federated learning to sybil-based poisoning attacks. We then describe \emph{FoolsGold}, a novel defense to this problem that identifies poisoning sybils based on the diversity of client updates in the distributed learning process. Unlike prior work, our system does not bound the expected number of attackers, requires no auxiliary information outside of the learning process, and makes fewer assumptions about clients and their data. In our evaluation we show that FoolsGold exceeds the capabilities of existing state of the art approaches to countering sybil-based label-flipping and backdoor poisoning attacks. Our results hold for different distributions of client data, varying poisoning targets, and various sybil strategies. Code can be found at: https://github.com/DistributedML/FoolsGold

arXiv:1807.00459공식 코드 · Papers with Code

How To Backdoor Federated Learning

Federated learning enables thousands of participants to construct a deep learning model without sharing their private training data with each other. For example, multiple smartphones can jointly train a next-word predictor for keyboards without revealing what individual users type. We demonstrate that any participant in federated learning can introduce hidden backdoor functionality into the joint global model, e.g., to ensure that an image classifier assigns an attacker-chosen label to images with certain features, or that a word predictor completes certain sentences with an attacker-chosen word. We design and evaluate a new model-poisoning methodology based on model replacement. An attacker selected in a single round of federated learning can cause the global model to immediately reach 100% accuracy on the backdoor task. We evaluate the attack under different assumptions for the standard federated-learning tasks and show that it greatly outperforms data poisoning. Our generic constrain-and-scale technique also evades anomaly detection-based defenses by incorporating the evasion into the attacker's loss function during training.

arXiv:2606.26285v1cs.CR

TEMPO-Diffusion: 확산 모델의 시간적 노출 악성 포이증

TEMPO-Diffusion: Temporally Exposed Malicious Poisoning of Diffusion Models

확산 모델의 노이즈 기반 백도어(backdoor) 공격이 입력 시점 트리거·비타겟·분포 밖 타겟 생성에 의존해 은밀성과 실용성이 제한되는 한계를 보완하기 위해, TEMPO-Diffusion은 악성 분포 이동을 시간적·분포 내(in-distribution) 노출로 한정하는 타겟 백door 프레임워크로 특정 클래스 공격, 다중 서브 이미지 백door, 시간 조건 트리거 인페인팅을 지원한다. 캐나다·미국 도로 표지판 중심 데이터셋 CALISA와 CIFAR10·GTSRB·CALISA 실험에서 클래스별 합성 데이터를 포이즌하고 다운스트림 분류기에서 높은 공격 성공률을 유도함을 보였다.