Privacy attacks on machine learning models aim to identify the data that is used to train such models. Such attacks, traditionally, are studied on static models that are trained once and are accessible by the adversary. Motivated to meet new legal requirements, many machine learning methods are recently extended to support machine unlearning, i.e., updating models as if certain examples are removed from their training sets, and meet new legal requirements. However, privacy attacks could potentially become more devastating in this new setting, since an attacker could now access both the original model before deletion and the new model after the deletion. In fact, the very act of deletion might make the deleted record more vulnerable to privacy attacks. Inspired by cryptographic definitions and the differential privacy framework, we formally study privacy implications of machine unlearning. We formalize (various forms of) deletion inference and deletion reconstruction attacks, in which the adversary aims to either identify which record is deleted or to reconstruct (perhaps part of) the deleted records. We then present successful deletion inference and reconstruction attacks for a variety of machine learning models and tasks such as classification, regression, and language models. Finally, we show that our attacks would provably be precluded if the schemes satisfy (variants of) Deletion Compliance (Garg, Goldwasser, and Vasudevan, Eurocrypt' 20).
While real-world applications of reinforcement learning are becoming popular, the security and robustness of RL systems are worthy of more attention and exploration. In particular, recent works have revealed that, in a multi-agent RL environment, backdoor trigger actions can be injected into a victim agent (a.k.a. Trojan agent), which can result in a catastrophic failure as soon as it sees the backdoor trigger action. To ensure the security of RL agents against malicious backdoors, in this work, we propose the problem of Backdoor Detection in a multi-agent competitive reinforcement learning system, with the objective of detecting Trojan agents as well as the corresponding potential trigger actions, and further trying to mitigate their Trojan behavior. In order to solve this problem, we propose PolicyCleanse that is based on the property that the activated Trojan agents accumulated rewards degrade noticeably after several timesteps. Along with PolicyCleanse, we also design a machine unlearning-based approach that can effectively mitigate the detected backdoor. Extensive experiments demonstrate that the proposed methods can accurately detect Trojan agents, and outperform existing backdoor mitigation baseline approaches by at least 3% in winning rate across various types of agents and environments.
Backdoor injection attack is an emerging threat to the security of neural networks, however, there still exist limited effective defense methods against the attack. In this paper, we propose BAERASE, a novel method that can erase the backdoor injected into the victim model through machine unlearning. Specifically, BAERASE mainly implements backdoor defense in two key steps. First, trigger pattern recovery is conducted to extract the trigger patterns infected by the victim model. Here, the trigger pattern recovery problem is equivalent to the one of extracting an unknown noise distribution from the victim model, which can be easily resolved by the entropy maximization based generative model. Subsequently, BAERASE leverages these recovered trigger patterns to reverse the backdoor injection procedure and induce the victim model to erase the polluted memories through a newly designed gradient ascent based machine unlearning method. Compared with the previous machine unlearning solutions, the proposed approach gets rid of the reliance on the full access to training data for retraining and shows higher effectiveness on backdoor erasing than existing fine-tuning or pruning methods. Moreover, experiments show that BAERASE can averagely lower the attack success rates of three kinds of state-of-the-art backdoor attacks by 99\% on four benchmark datasets.
Recommender systems provide essential web services by learning users' personal preferences from collected data. However, in many cases, systems also need to forget some training data. From the perspective of privacy, several privacy regulations have recently been proposed, requiring systems to eliminate any impact of the data whose owner requests to forget. From the perspective of utility, if a system's utility is damaged by some bad data, the system needs to forget these data to regain utility. From the perspective of usability, users can delete noise and incorrect entries so that a system can provide more useful recommendations. While unlearning is very important, it has not been well-considered in existing recommender systems. Although there are some researches have studied the problem of machine unlearning in the domains of image and text data, existing methods can not been directly applied to recommendation as they are unable to consider the collaborative information. In this paper, we propose RecEraser, a general and efficient machine unlearning framework tailored to recommendation task. The main idea of RecEraser is to partition the training set into multiple shards and train a constituent model for each shard. Specifically, to keep the collaborative information of the data, we first design three novel data partition algorithms to divide training data into balanced groups based on their similarity. Then, considering that different shard models do not uniformly contribute to the final prediction, we further propose an adaptive aggregation method to improve the global model utility. Experimental results on three public benchmarks show that RecEraser can not only achieve efficient unlearning, but also outperform the state-of-the-art unlearning methods in terms of model utility. The source code can be found at https://github.com/chenchongthu/Recommendation-Unlearning
Machine Learning models face increased concerns regarding the storage of personal user data and adverse impacts of corrupted data like backdoors or systematic bias. Machine Unlearning can address these by allowing post-hoc deletion of affected training data from a learned model. Achieving this task exactly is computationally expensive; consequently, recent works have proposed inexact unlearning algorithms to solve this approximately as well as evaluation methods to test the effectiveness of these algorithms. In this work, we first outline some necessary criteria for evaluation methods and show no existing evaluation satisfies them all. Then, we design a stronger black-box evaluation method called the Interclass Confusion (IC) test which adversarially manipulates data during training to detect the insufficiency of unlearning procedures. We also propose two analytically motivated baseline methods~(EU-k and CF-k) which outperform several popular inexact unlearning methods. Overall, we demonstrate how adversarial evaluation strategies can help in analyzing various unlearning phenomena which can guide the development of stronger unlearning algorithms.
Modern privacy regulations grant citizens the right to be forgotten by products, services and companies. In case of machine learning (ML) applications, this necessitates deletion of data not only from storage archives but also from ML models. Due to an increasing need for regulatory compliance required for ML applications, machine unlearning is becoming an emerging research problem. The right to be forgotten requests come in the form of removal of a certain set or class of data from the already trained ML model. Practical considerations preclude retraining of the model from scratch after discarding the deleted data. The few existing studies use either the whole training data, or a subset of training data, or some metadata stored during training to update the model weights for unlearning. However, in many cases, no data related to the training process or training samples may be accessible for the unlearning purpose. We therefore ask the question: is it possible to achieve unlearning with zero training samples? In this paper, we introduce the novel problem of zero-shot machine unlearning that caters for the extreme but practical scenario where zero original data samples are available for use. We then propose two novel solutions for zero-shot machine unlearning based on (a) error minimizing-maximizing noise and (b) gated knowledge transfer. These methods remove the information of the forget data from the model while maintaining the model efficacy on the retain data. The zero-shot approach offers good protection against the model inversion attacks and membership inference attacks. We introduce a new evaluation metric, Anamnesis Index (AIN) to effectively measure the quality of the unlearning method. The experiments show promising results for unlearning in deep learning models on benchmark vision data-sets. The source code is available here: https://github.com/ayu987/zero-shot-unlearning
Machine unlearning for security is studied in this context. Several spam email detection methods exist, each of which employs a different algorithm to detect undesired spam emails. But these models are vulnerable to attacks. Many attackers exploit the model by polluting the data, which are trained to the model in various ways. So to act deftly in such situations model needs to readily unlearn the polluted data without the need for retraining. Retraining is impractical in most cases as there is already a massive amount of data trained to the model in the past, which needs to be trained again just for removing a small amount of polluted data, which is often significantly less than 1%. This problem can be solved by developing unlearning frameworks for all spam detection models. In this research, unlearning module is integrated into spam detection models that are based on Naive Bayes, Decision trees, and Random Forests algorithms. To assess the benefits of unlearning over retraining, three spam detection models are polluted and exploited by taking attackers' positions and proving models' vulnerability. Reduction in accuracy and true positive rates are shown in each case showing the effect of pollution on models. Then unlearning modules are integrated into the models, and polluted data is unlearned; on testing the models after unlearning, restoration of performance is seen. Also, unlearning and retraining times are compared with different pollution data sizes on all models. On analyzing the findings, it can be concluded that unlearning is considerably superior to retraining. Results show that unlearning is fast, easy to implement, easy to use, and effective.
Machine learning models, especially deep models, may unintentionally remember information about their training data. Malicious attackers can thus pilfer some property about training data by attacking the model via membership inference attack or model inversion attack. Some regulations, such as the EU's GDPR, have enacted "The Right to Be Forgotten" to protect users' data privacy, enhancing individuals' sovereignty over their data. Therefore, removing training data information from a trained model has become a critical issue. In this paper, we present a GAN-based algorithm to delete data in deep models, which significantly improves deleting speed compared to retraining from scratch, especially in complicated scenarios. We have experimented on five commonly used datasets, and the experimental results show the efficiency of our method.
Unlearning the data observed during the training of a machine learning (ML) model is an important task that can play a pivotal role in fortifying the privacy and security of ML-based applications. This paper raises the following questions: (i) can we unlearn a single or multiple class(es) of data from a ML model without looking at the full training data even once? (ii) can we make the process of unlearning fast and scalable to large datasets, and generalize it to different deep networks? We introduce a novel machine unlearning framework with error-maximizing noise generation and impair-repair based weight manipulation that offers an efficient solution to the above questions. An error-maximizing noise matrix is learned for the class to be unlearned using the original model. The noise matrix is used to manipulate the model weights to unlearn the targeted class of data. We introduce impair and repair steps for a controlled manipulation of the network weights. In the impair step, the noise matrix along with a very high learning rate is used to induce sharp unlearning in the model. Thereafter, the repair step is used to regain the overall performance. With very few update steps, we show excellent unlearning while substantially retaining the overall model accuracy. Unlearning multiple classes requires a similar number of update steps as for a single class, making our approach scalable to large problems. Our method is quite efficient in comparison to the existing methods, works for multi-class unlearning, does not put any constraints on the original optimization mechanism or network design, and works well in both small and large-scale vision tasks. This work is an important step towards fast and easy implementation of unlearning in deep networks. Source code: https://github.com/vikram2000b/Fast-Machine-Unlearning
In recent years, machine learning neural network has penetrated deeply into people's life. As the price of convenience, people's private information also has the risk of disclosure. The "right to be forgotten" was introduced in a timely manner, stipulating that individuals have the right to withdraw their consent from personal information processing activities based on their consent. To solve this problem, machine unlearning is proposed, which allows the model to erase all memory of private information. Previous studies, including retraining and incremental learning to update models, often take up extra storage space or are difficult to apply to neural networks. Our method only needs to make a small perturbation of the weight of the target model and make it iterate in the direction of the model trained with the remaining data subset until the contribution of the unlearning data to the model is completely eliminated. In this paper, experiments on five datasets prove the effectiveness of our method for machine unlearning, and our method is 15 times faster than retraining.
Machine unlearning, i.e. having a model forget about some of its training data, has become increasingly more important as privacy legislation promotes variants of the right-to-be-forgotten. In the context of deep learning, approaches for machine unlearning are broadly categorized into two classes: exact unlearning methods, where an entity has formally removed the data point's impact on the model by retraining the model from scratch, and approximate unlearning, where an entity approximates the model parameters one would obtain by exact unlearning to save on compute costs. In this paper, we first show that the definition that underlies approximate unlearning, which seeks to prove the approximately unlearned model is close to an exactly retrained model, is incorrect because one can obtain the same model using different datasets. Thus one could unlearn without modifying the model at all. We then turn to exact unlearning approaches and ask how to verify their claims of unlearning. Our results show that even for a given training trajectory one cannot formally prove the absence of certain data points used during training. We thus conclude that unlearning is only well-defined at the algorithmic level, where an entity's only possible auditable claim to unlearning is that they used a particular algorithm designed to allow for external scrutiny during an audit.
Machine unlearning is the process through which a deployed machine learning model is made to forget about some of its training data points. While naively retraining the model from scratch is an option, it is almost always associated with large computational overheads for deep learning models. Thus, several approaches to approximately unlearn have been proposed along with corresponding metrics that formalize what it means for a model to forget about a data point. In this work, we first taxonomize approaches and metrics of approximate unlearning. As a result, we identify verification error, i.e., the L2 difference between the weights of an approximately unlearned and a naively retrained model, as an approximate unlearning metric that should be optimized for as it subsumes a large class of other metrics. We theoretically analyze the canonical training algorithm, stochastic gradient descent (SGD), to surface the variables which are relevant to reducing the verification error of approximate unlearning for SGD. From this analysis, we first derive an easy-to-compute proxy for verification error (termed unlearning error). The analysis also informs the design of a new training objective penalty that limits the overall change in weights during SGD and as a result facilitates approximate unlearning with lower verification error. We validate our theoretical work through an empirical evaluation on learning with CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and IMDB sentiment analysis.
The right to erasure requires removal of a user's information from data held by organizations, with rigorous interpretations extending to downstream products such as learned models. Retraining from scratch with the particular user's data omitted fully removes its influence on the resulting model, but comes with a high computational cost. Machine "unlearning" mitigates the cost incurred by full retraining: instead, models are updated incrementally, possibly only requiring retraining when approximation errors accumulate. Rapid progress has been made towards privacy guarantees on the indistinguishability of unlearned and retrained models, but current formalisms do not place practical bounds on computation. In this paper we demonstrate how an attacker can exploit this oversight, highlighting a novel attack surface introduced by machine unlearning. We consider an attacker aiming to increase the computational cost of data removal. We derive and empirically investigate a poisoning attack on certified machine unlearning where strategically designed training data triggers complete retraining when removed.
Removing information from a machine learning model is a non-trivial task that requires to partially revert the training process. This task is unavoidable when sensitive data, such as credit card numbers or passwords, accidentally enter the model and need to be removed afterwards. Recently, different concepts for machine unlearning have been proposed to address this problem. While these approaches are effective in removing individual data points, they do not scale to scenarios where larger groups of features and labels need to be reverted. In this paper, we propose the first method for unlearning features and labels. Our approach builds on the concept of influence functions and realizes unlearning through closed-form updates of model parameters. It enables to adapt the influence of training data on a learning model retrospectively, thereby correcting data leaks and privacy issues. For learning models with strongly convex loss functions, our method provides certified unlearning with theoretical guarantees. For models with non-convex losses, we empirically show that unlearning features and labels is effective and significantly faster than other strategies.
Machine unlearning is the task of updating machine learning (ML) models after a subset of the training data they were trained on is deleted. Methods for the task are desired to combine effectiveness and efficiency, i.e., they should effectively "unlearn" deleted data, but in a way that does not require excessive computation effort (e.g., a full retraining) for a small amount of deletions. Such a combination is typically achieved by tolerating some amount of approximation in the unlearning. In addition, laws and regulations in the spirit of "the right to be forgotten" have given rise to requirements for certifiability, i.e., the ability to demonstrate that the deleted data has indeed been unlearned by the ML model. In this paper, we present an experimental study of the three state-of-the-art approximate unlearning methods for linear models and demonstrate the trade-offs between efficiency, effectiveness and certifiability offered by each method. In implementing the study, we extend some of the existing works and describe a common ML pipeline to compare and evaluate the unlearning methods on six real-world datasets and a variety of settings. We provide insights into the effect of the quantity and distribution of the deleted data on ML models and the performance of each unlearning method in different settings. We also propose a practical online strategy to determine when the accumulated error from approximate unlearning is large enough to warrant a full retrain of the ML model.
Data deletion algorithms aim to remove the influence of deleted data points from trained models at a cheaper computational cost than fully retraining those models. However, for sequences of deletions, most prior work in the non-convex setting gives valid guarantees only for sequences that are chosen independently of the models that are published. If people choose to delete their data as a function of the published models (because they don't like what the models reveal about them, for example), then the update sequence is adaptive. In this paper, we give a general reduction from deletion guarantees against adaptive sequences to deletion guarantees against non-adaptive sequences, using differential privacy and its connection to max information. Combined with ideas from prior work which give guarantees for non-adaptive deletion sequences, this leads to extremely flexible algorithms able to handle arbitrary model classes and training methodologies, giving strong provable deletion guarantees for adaptive deletion sequences. We show in theory how prior work for non-convex models fails against adaptive deletion sequences, and use this intuition to design a practical attack against the SISA algorithm of Bourtoule et al. [2021] on CIFAR-10, MNIST, Fashion-MNIST.
Machine unlearning refers to mechanisms that can remove the influence of a subset of training data upon request from a trained model without incurring the cost of re-training from scratch. This paper develops a unified PAC-Bayesian framework for machine unlearning that recovers the two recent design principles - variational unlearning (Nguyen et.al., 2020) and forgetting Lagrangian (Golatkar et.al., 2020) - as information risk minimization problems (Zhang,2006). Accordingly, both criteria can be interpreted as PAC-Bayesian upper bounds on the test loss of the unlearned model that take the form of free energy metrics.
Machine unlearning has great significance in guaranteeing model security and protecting user privacy. Additionally, many legal provisions clearly stipulate that users have the right to demand model providers to delete their own data from training set, that is, the right to be forgotten. The naive way of unlearning data is to retrain the model without it from scratch, which becomes extremely time and resource consuming at the modern scale of deep neural networks. Other unlearning approaches by refactoring model or training data struggle to gain a balance between overhead and model usability. In this paper, we propose an approach, dubbed as DeepObliviate, to implement machine unlearning efficiently, without modifying the normal training mode. Our approach improves the original training process by storing intermediate models on the hard disk. Given a data point to unlearn, we first quantify its temporal residual memory left in stored models. The influenced models will be retrained and we decide when to terminate the retraining based on the trend of residual memory on-the-fly. Last, we stitch an unlearned model by combining the retrained models and uninfluenced models. We extensively evaluate our approach on five datasets and deep learning models. Compared to the method of retraining from scratch, our approach can achieve 99.0%, 95.0%, 91.9%, 96.7%, 74.1% accuracy rates and 66.7$\times$, 75.0$\times$, 33.3$\times$, 29.4$\times$, 13.7$\times$ speedups on the MNIST, SVHN, CIFAR-10, Purchase, and ImageNet datasets, respectively. Compared to the state-of-the-art unlearning approach, we improve 5.8% accuracy, 32.5$\times$ prediction speedup, and reach a comparable retrain speedup under identical settings on average on these datasets. Additionally, DeepObliviate can also pass the backdoor-based unlearning verification.
Machine unlearning is a process of removing the impact of some training data from the machine learning (ML) models upon receiving removal requests. While straightforward and legitimate, retraining the ML model from scratch incurs a high computational overhead. To address this issue, a number of approximate algorithms have been proposed in the domain of image and text data, among which SISA is the state-of-the-art solution. It randomly partitions the training set into multiple shards and trains a constituent model for each shard. However, directly applying SISA to the graph data can severely damage the graph structural information, and thereby the resulting ML model utility. In this paper, we propose GraphEraser, a novel machine unlearning framework tailored to graph data. Its contributions include two novel graph partition algorithms and a learning-based aggregation method. We conduct extensive experiments on five real-world graph datasets to illustrate the unlearning efficiency and model utility of GraphEraser. It achieves 2.06$\times$ (small dataset) to 35.94$\times$ (large dataset) unlearning time improvement. On the other hand, GraphEraser achieves up to $62.5\%$ higher F1 score and our proposed learning-based aggregation method achieves up to $112\%$ higher F1 score.\footnote{Our code is available at \url{https://github.com/MinChen00/Graph-Unlearning}.}
We study the problem of unlearning datapoints from a learnt model. The learner first receives a dataset $S$ drawn i.i.d. from an unknown distribution, and outputs a model $\widehat{w}$ that performs well on unseen samples from the same distribution. However, at some point in the future, any training datapoint $z \in S$ can request to be unlearned, thus prompting the learner to modify its output model while still ensuring the same accuracy guarantees. We initiate a rigorous study of generalization in machine unlearning, where the goal is to perform well on previously unseen datapoints. Our focus is on both computational and storage complexity. For the setting of convex losses, we provide an unlearning algorithm that can unlearn up to $O(n/d^{1/4})$ samples, where $d$ is the problem dimension. In comparison, in general, differentially private learning (which implies unlearning) only guarantees deletion of $O(n/d^{1/2})$ samples. This demonstrates a novel separation between differential privacy and machine unlearning.