Understanding the non-literal meaning of an utterance is critical for large language models (LLMs) to become human-like social communicators. In this work, we introduce SwordsmanImp, the first Chinese multi-turn-dialogue-based dataset aimed at conversational implicature, sourced from dialogues in the Chinese sitcom $\textit{My Own Swordsman}$. It includes 200 carefully handcrafted questions, all annotated on which Gricean maxims have been violated. We test eight close-source and open-source LLMs under two tasks: a multiple-choice question task and an implicature explanation task. Our results show that GPT-4 attains human-level accuracy (94%) on multiple-choice questions. CausalLM demonstrates a 78.5% accuracy following GPT-4. Other models, including GPT-3.5 and several open-source models, demonstrate a lower accuracy ranging from 20% to 60% on multiple-choice questions. Human raters were asked to rate the explanation of the implicatures generated by LLMs on their reasonability, logic and fluency. While all models generate largely fluent and self-consistent text, their explanations score low on reasonability except for GPT-4, suggesting that most LLMs cannot produce satisfactory explanations of the implicatures in the conversation. Moreover, we find LLMs' performance does not vary significantly by Gricean maxims, suggesting that LLMs do not seem to process implicatures derived from different maxims differently. Our data and code are available at https://github.com/sjtu-compling/llm-pragmatics.
Scalar adjectives pertain to various domain scales and vary in intensity within each scale (e.g. certain is more intense than likely on the likelihood scale). Scalar implicatures arise from the consideration of alternative statements which could have been made. They can be triggered by scalar adjectives and require listeners to reason pragmatically about them. Some scalar adjectives are more likely to trigger scalar implicatures than others. This phenomenon is referred to as scalar diversity. In this study, we probe different families of Large Language Models such as GPT-4 for their knowledge of the lexical semantics of scalar adjectives and one specific aspect of their pragmatics, namely scalar diversity. We find that they encode rich lexical-semantic information about scalar adjectives. However, the rich lexical-semantic knowledge does not entail a good understanding of scalar diversity. We also compare current models of different sizes and complexities and find that larger models are not always better. Finally, we explain our probing results by leveraging linguistic intuitions and model training objectives.
Interactive Task Learning (ITL) concerns learning about unforeseen domain concepts via natural interactions with human users. The learner faces a number of significant constraints: learning should be online, incremental and few-shot, as it is expected to perform tangible belief updates right after novel words denoting unforeseen concepts are introduced. In this work, we explore a challenging symbol grounding task--discriminating among object classes that look very similar--within the constraints imposed by ITL. We demonstrate empirically that more data-efficient grounding results from exploiting the truth-conditions of the teacher's generic statements (e.g., "Xs have attribute Z.") and their implicatures in context (e.g., as an answer to "How are Xs and Ys different?", one infers Y lacks attribute Z).
Natural language inference (NLI) is an increasingly important task for natural language understanding, which requires one to infer whether a sentence entails another. However, the ability of NLI models to make pragmatic inferences remains understudied. We create an IMPlicature and PRESupposition diagnostic dataset (IMPPRES), consisting of >25k semiautomatically generated sentence pairs illustrating well-studied pragmatic inference types. We use IMPPRES to evaluate whether BERT, InferSent, and BOW NLI models trained on MultiNLI (Williams et al., 2018) learn to make pragmatic inferences. Although MultiNLI appears to contain very few pairs illustrating these inference types, we find that BERT learns to draw pragmatic inferences. It reliably treats scalar implicatures triggered by "some" as entailments. For some presupposition triggers like "only", BERT reliably recognizes the presupposition as an entailment, even when the trigger is embedded under an entailment canceling operator like negation. BOW and InferSent show weaker evidence of pragmatic reasoning. We conclude that NLI training encourages models to learn some, but not all, pragmatic inferences.