Gradient-based training in federated learning is known to be vulnerable to faulty/malicious clients, which are often modeled as Byzantine clients. To this end, previous work either makes use of auxiliary data at parameter server to verify the received gradients (e.g., by computing validation error rate) or leverages statistic-based methods (e.g. median and Krum) to identify and remove malicious gradients from Byzantine clients. In this paper, we remark that auxiliary data may not always be available in practice and focus on the statistic-based approach. However, recent work on model poisoning attacks has shown that well-crafted attacks can circumvent most of median- and distance-based statistical defense methods, making malicious gradients indistinguishable from honest ones. To tackle this challenge, we show that the element-wise sign of gradient vector can provide valuable insight in detecting model poisoning attacks. Based on our theoretical analysis of the \textit{Little is Enough} attack, we propose a novel approach called \textit{SignGuard} to enable Byzantine-robust federated learning through collaborative malicious gradient filtering. More precisely, the received gradients are first processed to generate relevant magnitude, sign, and similarity statistics, which are then collaboratively utilized by multiple filters to eliminate malicious gradients before final aggregation. Finally, extensive experiments of image and text classification tasks are conducted under recently proposed attacks and defense strategies. The numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness and superiority of our proposed approach. The code is available at \textit{\url{https://github.com/JianXu95/SignGuard}}
Federated learning is vulnerable to various attacks, such as model poisoning and backdoor attacks, even if some existing defense strategies are used. To address this challenge, we propose an attack-adaptive aggregation strategy to defend against various attacks for robust federated learning. The proposed approach is based on training a neural network with an attention mechanism that learns the vulnerability of federated learning models from a set of plausible attacks. To the best of our knowledge, our aggregation strategy is the first one that can be adapted to defend against various attacks in a data-driven fashion. Our approach has achieved competitive performance in defending model poisoning and backdoor attacks in federated learning tasks on image and text datasets.
Fairness and robustness are two important concerns for federated learning systems. In this work, we identify that robustness to data and model poisoning attacks and fairness, measured as the uniformity of performance across devices, are competing constraints in statistically heterogeneous networks. To address these constraints, we propose employing a simple, general framework for personalized federated learning, Ditto, that can inherently provide fairness and robustness benefits, and develop a scalable solver for it. Theoretically, we analyze the ability of Ditto to achieve fairness and robustness simultaneously on a class of linear problems. Empirically, across a suite of federated datasets, we show that Ditto not only achieves competitive performance relative to recent personalization methods, but also enables more accurate, robust, and fair models relative to state-of-the-art fair or robust baselines.
Federated learning distributes model training among a multitude of agents, who, guided by privacy concerns, perform training using their local data but share only model parameter updates, for iterative aggregation at the server. In this work, we explore the threat of model poisoning attacks on federated learning initiated by a single, non-colluding malicious agent where the adversarial objective is to cause the model to misclassify a set of chosen inputs with high confidence. We explore a number of strategies to carry out this attack, starting with simple boosting of the malicious agent's update to overcome the effects of other agents' updates. To increase attack stealth, we propose an alternating minimization strategy, which alternately optimizes for the training loss and the adversarial objective. We follow up by using parameter estimation for the benign agents' updates to improve on attack success. Finally, we use a suite of interpretability techniques to generate visual explanations of model decisions for both benign and malicious models and show that the explanations are nearly visually indistinguishable. Our results indicate that even a highly constrained adversary can carry out model poisoning attacks while simultaneously maintaining stealth, thus highlighting the vulnerability of the federated learning setting and the need to develop effective defense strategies.
Machine learning (ML) over distributed multi-party data is required for a variety of domains. Existing approaches, such as federated learning, collect the outputs computed by a group of devices at a central aggregator and run iterative algorithms to train a globally shared model. Unfortunately, such approaches are susceptible to a variety of attacks, including model poisoning, which is made substantially worse in the presence of sybils. In this paper we first evaluate the vulnerability of federated learning to sybil-based poisoning attacks. We then describe \emph{FoolsGold}, a novel defense to this problem that identifies poisoning sybils based on the diversity of client updates in the distributed learning process. Unlike prior work, our system does not bound the expected number of attackers, requires no auxiliary information outside of the learning process, and makes fewer assumptions about clients and their data. In our evaluation we show that FoolsGold exceeds the capabilities of existing state of the art approaches to countering sybil-based label-flipping and backdoor poisoning attacks. Our results hold for different distributions of client data, varying poisoning targets, and various sybil strategies. Code can be found at: https://github.com/DistributedML/FoolsGold
Federated learning enables thousands of participants to construct a deep learning model without sharing their private training data with each other. For example, multiple smartphones can jointly train a next-word predictor for keyboards without revealing what individual users type. We demonstrate that any participant in federated learning can introduce hidden backdoor functionality into the joint global model, e.g., to ensure that an image classifier assigns an attacker-chosen label to images with certain features, or that a word predictor completes certain sentences with an attacker-chosen word. We design and evaluate a new model-poisoning methodology based on model replacement. An attacker selected in a single round of federated learning can cause the global model to immediately reach 100% accuracy on the backdoor task. We evaluate the attack under different assumptions for the standard federated-learning tasks and show that it greatly outperforms data poisoning. Our generic constrain-and-scale technique also evades anomaly detection-based defenses by incorporating the evasion into the attacker's loss function during training.